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At the beginning of the 21st century, there is no problem in our society more troubling
than the vast disparities in economic well-being that exist among Americans. Poverty
and severe economic insecurity endured through the boom of the late 1990s, and bold,
unified national action to remedy this situation remains elusive. Today, leaders of both
political parties express a commitment to increasing economic opportunity and re d u c i n g
poverty. But the approaches they put forth for achieving these goals often differ dra-
matically, as the recent debate over welfare reauthorization has shown.
Can these differences and deadlocks in our politics be overcome? Is it not possible
for America’s elected leaders to find greater common ground on issues of economic
security and embark upon major new efforts to build a more equitable society? This
report answers a cautious “yes” to these questions. 
The report analyzes four public policies that have been developed or expanded over
the past decade: the Earned Income Tax Credit, Individual Development Accounts, the
State Children’s Health Insurance Program, and Empowerment Zones. The re p o rt
places development of these policies within the context of shifts in values and in how
debates over economic security are framed. The report draws upon an extensive review
of federal and state legislative re c o rds, newspaper accounts, and the publications of
public policy organizations. In addition, the authors corresponded with numero u s
scholars and policy analysts whose views represent both sides of the political divide. 
The central conclusion of the re p o rt is that areas of new common ground have emerg e d
a c ross ideological divides among elected leaders and public policy thinkers, and that this
common ground has the potential to be deepened—opening the way for major new
e ff o rts to increase economic opportunity and reduce poverty in the coming years. 
This study is the second re p o rt released by De-m o s that explores areas of common
g round over povert y, inequality, and public policy. The first re p o rt, New Opport u n i t i e s,
was released in January 2002 and examined public opinion in this area, analyzing dozens
of polls conducted between 1996 and 2001. Like this re p o rt, New Opport u n i t i e s h i g h-
lighted promising areas of consensus—while identifying enduring disagreements and
tensions in public opinion. Both studies were undertaken as part of De-m o s’s ongoing
e ff o rts to focus new public and political attention on the challenge of closing America’s
p rosperity gap. De-m o s’s other major area of work, democracy re f o rm, re flects our
view that addressing this and other urgent national problems re q u i res broader par-
ticipation by all Americans. 
Miles Rapoport
President, De-mos
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Major ideological divisions endure in public policy debates over poverty and economic
s e c u r i t y. The last decade has seen fie rce battles over welfare, health care, Social Security
and Medicare, taxes, and other issues critical to the lives of low-income families and indi-
viduals. However, a growing convergence of views between liberals and conservatives in
key areas—such as the importance of work and personal re s p o n s i b i l i t y, the need to help
working families, and the need to help communities and individuals build wealth—sug-
gests the potential for a new political consensus in coming years. 
Growing Agreement on Values and Goals
Over the last decade, Republicans and Democrats have come together in eff o rts to
increase the economic well-being of low-income Americans in four notable areas:
• Making Work Pay through legislation to expand the Earned Income Tax Credit.
Legislation supported by President Bush in 1990 and President Clinton in 1993
transformed the EITC into one of the most effective government programs that helps
low-income families. Sixteen states have also enacted EITCs, often with strong bipar-
tisan support.
• Building Wealth and Assets t h rough the creation of Individual Development Accounts
(IDAs). IDAs have been embraced by both parties at the national and state level as
an effective way to help low-income individuals acquire assets.
• Helping Working Families by extending healthcare coverage to low-income chil-
dren. The passage of the State Children’s Health Insurance Program in 1997 with
bipartisan support represented the most significant extension of government health
insurance since the creation of Medicare. 
Executive Summary
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• Community Development, through the creation of
E m p o w e rment Zones. Empowerment Zones have helped
to direct billions of dollars in government tax breaks and
financing to impoverished neighborhoods.
A Changing National Debate
Since the mid-1990s, several important factors have helped
to shift the terrain of public policy debates over poverty and
economic security, including:
• Welfare Reform. Welfare reform has elevated the role
of work yet illuminated the hidden costs of work faced
by all families, and has spotlighted the problems of the
low-wage labor market.
• Changes in the Economy. High growth and job cre a t i o n
make it easier for people to find work, but there is gro w i n g
economic insecurity among more and more Americans.
• Shifts in Public Opinion. The public continues to stre s s
personal responsibility but shows growing levels of support
for policies to assist low-income working individuals and
families.
• Policy Innovation. New strategies have been developed
for building economic security aimed at increasing wages
for low-skilled workers, building wealth and assets, and
providing supports for working families.
Prospects for a New Consensus
A new political consensus around poverty and economic
security may now be in sight—a consensus that would enable
a fresh, comprehensive effort to create a more equitable
economy and strengthen the social safety net. In the short
t e rm, areas of emerging consensus are most likely to be
manifested through a growing tempo of incremental gains
in expanding those public policies to help low-income people
that now enjoy some bipartisan support. The most pro m i s i n g
areas for progress include:
• Income and Wages. Growing political agreement over
the need to increase the prospects of low-income workers
p resents advocates with a range of opportunities to expand
federal and state EITCs and to achieve both minimum
wage increases and the passage of “living wage” ordi-
nances. Eff o rts to build skills and job opportunities enjoy
especially high levels of bipartisan support.
• Health Care and Child Care . I n c reasing agre e m e n t
about the need to ensure that low-income working pare n t s
are able to work opens up major new opportunities to
advance proposals for greater subsidized childcare, as
well as expanding health care for all low-income adults.
• Wealth-Building Policies. The considerable success of
pilot IDA programs in galvanizing bipartisan support at
the national and state level suggests the potential to
g reatly expand these programs in the coming years. Also,
the growing strength of the community economic devel-
opment movement, and the bipartisan enthusiasm this
work often attracts, suggests the potential to scale up
various eff o rts aimed at building the wealth of low-
income communities. 
During the 20th century, many policies aimed at reducing poverty and building economic
security were enacted or expanded during periods of broad political consensus about how
to foster greater equity. Since the early 1980s, however, issues of poverty and economic
o p p o rtunity have been among the most divisive areas of American politics. The first year
of the George W. Bush administration saw these divisions fla re up in polarized debates
about taxes, Medicare, Social Security, the economic stimulus package, and a range of
social programs. In early 2002, congressional debate over the reauthorization of the 1996
w e l f a re law revealed these partisan tensions, with the Bush administration emphasizing
stricter work re q u i rements and eff o rts to promote marriage, and many Democrats stre s s i n g
new investments in child care and job training to help move people out of povert y. 
Meanwhile, the challenges faced by low-income Americans remain great: Nearly 50
million Americans live below 125 percent of the poverty line; a third of families have
z e ro or negative assets; and tens of millions of working parents lack key supports like
a ff o rdable child care and health care. African-Americans and Latinos are especially likely
to be living in poverty or barely getting by on the lower rungs of the middle class. For
the many Americans who did not share in the prosperity of the ’90s, political dead-
locks in Washington and in state capitals have had profoundly harmful consequences. 
The United States has succeeded in the past at making major strides toward expanding
economic opportunity and improving well-being for everyone. Renewing this pro g re s s
will now re q u i re a higher level of political consensus about how to address the pro b-
lems of America’s prosperity gap. To be enacted in legislation—and to be fully imple-
mented in good faith over ensuing years and decades—policy initiatives to bro a d e n
economic security re q u i re strong bipartisan backing. While short - t e rm partisan advan-
tages can get policies enacted, long-term political consensus is re q u i red if policies are
to succeed. For advocates trying to promote greater equity, a central challenge is to
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develop or expand policies that resonate with value systems
on both sides of the political divide. A related challenge
is to discuss these policies in ways that capture the support
of a public that is divided over such questions as the causes
of povert y, the extent of opportunity that exists in the
United States, and the role of government in addre s s i n g
economic inequities.
This re p o rt explores the nature of common gro u n d
a round public policy aimed at improving the economic well-
being of low-income individuals and families. While high-
lighting the significant differences in values and approach
that exist in the political arena, the re p o rt suggests that
t h e re has been more convergence of perspectives than many
people realize. During the last decade, Republicans and
Democrats have come together to enact or expand several
historic efforts to enhance economic well-being, including:
• The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). I n c reases in
the Earned Income Tax Credit—which re w a rds work
by giving tax credits to low-income income families—
by President Bush in 1990 and President Clinton in
1993 transformed it into the single most effective gov-
e rnment program that helps working poor families.
Sixteen states have also enacted EITCs, often with
s t rong bipartisan support .
• Individual Development Accounts (IDAs). Since 1990,
IDAs—which are special matched savings accounts—
have gone from a scholarly idea to being a significant new
pilot program embraced by both parties at both the
national and state level. IDAs are helping thousands of
low-income individuals acquire assets. 
• The State Children’s Health Insurance Pro g r a m
(SCHIP). The passage of SCHIP in 1997 with bipar-
tisan support represented the most significant extension
of government health insurance since the creation of
M e d i c a re and Medicaid. More than 2.5 million low-
income children are enrolled in SCHIP.
• E m p o w e rment Zones. The 1990s saw bipartisan support
for the creation of Empowerment Zones that leveraged
several billion dollars in government tax breaks and fin a n c i n g
with the goal of aiding impoverished neighborhoods. 
These advances in public policy have not gone nearly
as far as some have hoped. These and many other eff e c-
tive measures to increase economic well-being and oppor-
tunity for lower-income Americans have often not been
implemented at the scale needed to make a real diff e rence. 
Still, the developments in public policy that this report
examines are significant. Recent bipartisan backing for poli-
cies to support low-income working families and build
wealth among poor individuals and communities hints at a
potential new political consensus. During the last few years,
after a long domestic cold war, liberals and conservatives
have begun to find some new common ground on values
related to economic equity and social policy. Liberals are
now more likely to stress traditional conservative themes
like the importance of work, entre p reneurship, and per-
sonal responsibility; conservatives are invoking liberal ideas
such as the need to make work pay and to help poor fami-
lies and communities build wealth and assets. Today, it is
possible to talk about a new debate in America about povert y
and economic security—one that is very diff e rent fro m
debates of the past quarter century. 
Old Problems, a New Debate
America’s debate over poverty and economic security is
fluid. The debate has been evolving and shifting since 1996,
when President Clinton signed the welfare reform bill into
law. Indeed, at any given point in time, it is not easy to fully
understand and capture the ways that this debate is being
framed and structured within national and local political
arenas. The conventional wisdom holds that the political
center on issues of poverty and public policy has moved sharply
to the right over the past decade. While that analysis largely
c a p t u res re a l i t y, this re p o rt suggests a more complex picture .
After a long domestic cold war, liberals and 
conservatives have begun to find some common ground 
on values related to economic equity and social policy.
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Instead of a uniform shift in one ideological direction, it is
possible to see the terms of political discourse as shifting
into new terrain altogether and confounding the polarized
frameworks of past debates. 
To be sure, conservatives have scored historic victories
in recent years. These include eliminating the federal welfare
entitlement; devolving significant social policy re s p o n s i-
bilities to the states; introducing partial privatization of
Social Security into the mainstream political discourse;
blocking President Clinton’s national health insurance plan;
and reducing in real terms the growth of many federal and
state programs aimed at helping low-income families. But
these much-publicized victories—often won with support
of moderate Democrats—are not the entire story. Since the
mid-1990s, the context for public debates about the pro b-
lems of poverty and economic security have shifted in other
d i rections due to the impact of welfare re f o rm, changes in
the economy, shifts in public opinion, and policy innova-
tion at the national and local level. 
The Impact of Welfare Reform
The implementation of welfare re f o rm has dramatically
changed the terrain of debates over public policy aff e c t i n g
low-income people. On the one hand, a major consequence
of welfare re f o rm has been to seal the political victory of
those who long emphasized the necessity for work among
recipients of public assistance. To d a y, political leaders who
do not accept this axiom are effectively marginalized fro m
the mainstream terms of debate. On the other hand, the
t r a n s f o rmation of welfare to a work-based system has helped
illuminate the hidden costs of work faced by all families
and has spotlighted the problems of the low-wage labor
market: the lack of good jobs that help workers escape
p o v e rty; inadequate health care and child care for low-
income workers; few opportunities for advancement; and
pockets of high unemployment. As a result, the political
and public dialogue has shifted away from welfare and
dependency and toward enabling work and “making work
p a y.” In this way, welfare re f o rm has blurred the old dis-
tinctions between the “welfare poor” and the “working
poor”—making it potentially easier to garner political
s u p p o rt to help all low-income individuals and families.
Changes in the Economy 
A second factor altering public policy debates is the con-
tinued restructuring of the U.S. economy. The last decade
has brought enormous economic prosperity, but also con-
tinued stagnation of incomes for many households and an
accelerated trend toward greater economic insecurity for more
and more Americans. Low overall levels of unemployment
helped to solidify the idea that everyone should be working,
but much job growth has been in sectors with poor pay and
few benefits. Contingent work and independent contracting
arrangements have also become far more common, intro-
ducing greater insecurity even among skilled workers.
Increasingly, the perennial challenges faced by low-income
households, such as the lack of affordable health care, child
c a re, and housing, are also being experienced by house-
holds in higher-income brackets. The problems of a gro w i n g
number of working families across income brackets wors-
ened even as the New Economy delivered dramatic income
gains and massive wealth accumulation to households at the
very top of the economic ladder.
Shifting Public Opinion
Changes in social policy and the economy are re flected in
shifts in public opinion about economic security issues.
While Americans have always supported work as a cor-
nerstone of social policy eff o rts, they are increasingly re c-
ognizing in the post-welfare re f o rm environment that
personal responsibility can go only so far in re d u c i n g
p o v e rt y, and there is a high level of public support for
policies to assist low-income working individuals and fam-
ilies (see table below). Surveys also show that the uneven
e ffect of the economic boom of the late 1990s made many
Americans feel left behind. Currently more than one-third
of Americans view themselves as a “have-not”—compare d
to just 17 percent in 1988. Tw o - t h i rds of the public believes
Welfare reform has blurred the old distinctions 
between the “welfare poor” and the “working poor.”
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that something needs to be done about the income gap
between the wealthy and other Americans.1 Another fin d i n g
of opinion surveys is that Americans increasingly want
their political leaders to find pragmatic, nonideological
solutions to public policy challenges. 
Policy Innovation
A final factor reshaping political debates over poverty is
significant policy innovation at the national, state, and
local level. The last decade has been a period of enorm o u s
experimental activity and innovation in public policy aimed
at enhancing economic well-being and opportunity for
low-income Americans. Important developments in the
1990s include the growth of a large and varied commu-
nity economic development movement that has developed
a range of ways to build aff o rdable housing, support local
business and enterprise, and increase financial literacy.
T h e re has also been the rise of a sophisticated asset-building
movement that has successfully promoted Individual
Development Accounts and is putting forth a range of
related proposals. Meanwhile, new strategies have been
developed for increasing the skills, job opportunities, and
wages of low-income workers, both through job training
and by strengthening certain sectors of local economies.
F i n a l l y, there has been the development of various fre s h
Public Support for Key Policies
% Support % Oppose
Increasing the minimum wage 85 14
Increasing tax credits for low-income workers 80 17
Increasing cash assistance for families 54 40
Expanding subsidized day care 85 12
Spending more for medical care for poor people 83 14
Spending more for housing for poor people 75 23
Making food stamps more available to poor people 61 35
Guaranteeing everyone a minimum income 57 39
P e rcentages do not add up to 100 because “don’t know” responses are not
shown. Source: Kaiser Family Foundation/Harv a rd University/NPR, 2001.
ideas, often pioneered at the state level, to provide aff o rd-
able health care and child care to working families. 
Most of these new ideas and approaches have not come
close to realizing their potential—largely because of a lack
of political will. Signific a n t l y, however, much of the policy
innovation has emphasized approaches and values that take
into account common past objections to anti-poverty pro-
grams. Many of the newer strategies for building economic
well-being stress the importance of work, savings, and
wealth rather than legal entitlements; emphasize the need
for flexible and nonbureaucratic administration, as well as
local control and empowerment; and seek to stretch the
re s o u rces of government through partnerships between
public, private, and nonpro fit entities. 
At its core, America’s changing debate over economic
well-being and opportunity reflects more than shifts in
public opinion or discussion over particular policies. It also
re flects shifts in the values of the elected officials, public policy
thinkers, and community leaders who frame this debate. The
following discussion explores growing consensus and
enduring conflict over values within public policy discus-
sions affecting low-income Americans. 
Greater Consensus on Values?
Public policy debates over poverty and economic opport u-
nity are not technocratic exercises. They are deeply emotional
debates that re flect the value systems of participants and our
society at large. During the New Deal and Great Society eras,
these debates were largely framed by a values-based story
about fairness, compassion, and faith in collective solutions
that generated wide agreement among both the public and
political leaders. During the 1930s, widespread economic
insecurity across American society produced high levels of
s u p p o rt for a policy agenda that translated these values into
universal social programs. During the 1960s, at the peak of
U.S. industrial capitalism, unprecedented prosperity and
high economic security for many Americans allowed these
values to be translated more expansively in the public are n a ,
t h rough a political narrative and policy agenda that empha-
sized the strengthening of social programs and the extending
There is a growing level of public support for policies to
assist low-income working individuals and families.
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of opportunity to marginalized groups. The dominance of
this story helped account for major legislative victories in
enacting or strengthening a wide panoply of anti-povert y
p rograms up through the 1960s and early 1970s. 
In the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s, however, changes
in America’s economy and social fabric helped give rise to a
far more divisive debate over poverty and opport u n i t y.
G rowing economic insecurity, as well as racial polarization
and greater distrust of government, helped transform social
policy into an arena where diff e rent value systems competed
against each other more fie rc e l y. To d a y, many of these divi-
sions still endure, but the shifts in public policy, the economy,
and public opinion discussed above are once more changing
the values terrain of the poverty debate—with signs visible
of more common ground on core values.
The Clash of Values
During the major debates over poverty and economic inse-
curity in the 1980s and 1990s, liberals and conserv a t i v e s
w e re deeply divided in the core values that they art i c u l a t e d
when discussing these problems and proposing public policy
solutions. Even as this clash of values has lessened, starkly
d i ff e rent worldviews continue to frame debates.
The core liberal worldview has typically included the fol-
lowing key elements:
• The fruits of growth and prosperity should be shared as
equitably as possible across society. Government inter-
vention, along with labor unions and employer re s p o n s i-
b i l i t y, are imperative to ensuring shared pro s p e r i t y, as well
as guaranteeing people’s basic needs and well-being.
• P o v e rty and low socioeconomic status are generally the
result of systemic economic and social conditions (espe-
cially racial discrimination) that produce unequal oppor-
tunity and trap people in unfavorable circ u m s t a n c e s .
• Work doesn’t pay adequately for low-skilled individuals and
is particularly difficult for working parents with childre n ,
who need a range of supports to be able to work.
• Ambitious solutions to poverty and unequal opport u n i t y
a re aff o rdable given the wealth of American society.
The conservative worldview has typically held that:
• The American Dream is alive and well. Wealth and eco-
nomic resources are appropriately allocated in our free-
market system, which provides plenty of opportunity to
anyone willing to work hard.
• Individuals are chiefly responsible for their own advance-
ment. Personal irresponsibility and the collapse of tradi-
tional values are the chief causes of poverty.
• Too much government benevolence discourages hard
work, produces dependency, and saps the will of indi-
viduals to improve their economic situation. 
• An expensive social welfare state, as well as other re d i s-
tributive and re g u l a t o ry policies, imposes tax burd e n s
that undermine wealth creation in America, and re s u l t s
in less economic opportunity for everyone, including low-
income people. 
To d a y, neither liberals nor conservatives have abandoned
longstanding worldviews that often suggest very different
approaches to the problem of poverty and unequal oppor-
t u n i t y.2 H o w e v e r, ideological leaders on both sides of
America’s political divide have ceded some ground on values
that may pave the way for broader agreement. More impor-
tantly, certain policy solutions that are consistent with both
worldviews are becoming more central to public policy debates
over poverty and economic opportunity. Below, we provide a
closer look at shifts in two main areas of agreement and dis-
agreement on core values or issues related to poverty. 
Work and Personal Responsibility
The 1990s saw a considerable shift in how issues of work and
personal responsibility factor into public policy debates over
p o v e rt y. These debates continue to re flect polarized core
beliefs about the causes of povert y, with conservatives stre s s i n g
a lack of personal responsibility among those who are poor
and liberals stressing systemic causes, especially problems in
the labor market. Conservatives and liberals disagree about
the availability of well paying jobs, the length of time that
the working poor remain poor, and the work re q u i re m e n t s
The old and divisive debate over poverty—a debate 
that extended roughly from the early 1970s to the 
mid-1990s—can be viewed as decisively over.
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that are realistic for those on welfare. Conservatives often see
low-wage jobs as a stepping-stone to the American Dre a m ,
while liberals often see them as a permanent dead end and
d e c ry reduced economic mobility in U.S. society. There is
also strong disagreement about measures aimed at incre a s i n g
the value of work, such as minimum wage hikes and living
wage ordinances. 
F u rt h e rm o re, national and state public policy debates
are often marked by polarized views about the generosity
of government programs aimed at enabling work by subsi-
dizing child care, health care, and transportation for low-
income people. Liberals typically argue that it is hypocritical
to insist upon work without addressing the high costs that
these demands impose. For example, in response to Pre s i d e n t
Bush’s proposals in early 2002 for welfare reform, which
emphasized stricter work re q u i rements, Children’s Defense
Fund president Marian Wright Edelman commented: “The
president requires more hours of work, but not one dime
more for child care. . . . Right now only one in seven chil-
d ren eligible for federal childcare assistance gets it.” 3
C o n s e rvatives, meanwhile, often argue against expensive
work support systems on fiscal grounds, and also challenge
the competence of government to implement them. 
Still, there has been significant movement in ideolog-
ical positioning around values related to work and personal
re s p o n s i b i l i t y. 
• There is growing acceptance by conservatives of the idea
that families of working parents should not live below
the federal poverty line. This was demonstrated during
the 1990s by Republican support in Congress for a major
i n c rease in the federal tax expenditures on the EITC
program, as well as by Republican support in many states
for EITCs. Although some conservatives now wish to
roll back recent EITC gains or oppose further expansion,
others support more federal investment in this program.
“I’d support expansion of EITCs for married couples,”
prominent conservative thinker Marvin Olasky has said.4
• Many liberals no longer contest the argument that work
should be expected of nearly all welfare recipients, including
mothers with small children. Long-time liberal policy
analyst Isabel Sawhill, writing with Adam Thomas in a
May 2001 paper, commented: “We would suggest that
any policy that has as its long-term objective the reduc-
tion of poverty ought to focus on supporting work. This
is not only the most effective means of reducing poverty;
it is also consistent with public expectations and values.”5
• L o n g - t e rm liberal concerns about access to aff o rd a b l e
health care and child care have increasingly also been
echoed by many Republicans, who acknowledge the
need for these supports in order to ensure that people
can work. Legislation for children’s health insurance
e m e rged from a Republican Congress in 1997, and nearly
all Republican leaders and conservative think tanks stre s s
the need to find better ways to provide aff o rdable health
insurance to working families and individuals—although
most emphasize free-market mechanisms to accomplish
this objective. These same leaders and organizations also
i n c reasingly address childcare issues. 
• A community-based fatherhood movement has spru n g
up in recent years, with pro g ressive African-American re l i-
gious leaders and others placing a new emphasis on per-
sonal responsibility among young men—an issue that used
to be emphasized almost exclusively by conservatives. For
example, the African American Male Empowerm e n t
Summit, a series of events through 2001, was convened
for “celebrating African American fatherhood thro u g h
mentoring, business, family and community develop-
ment.” Speakers included Cornel West, the Reverend Al
Sharpton, and the Reverend Jesse Jackson.6
• Some conservatives support heavier government spending
to ensure that welfare reform actually advances the prin-
ciple of helping people achieve economic independence.
“I think there is already good consensus on expanding
help for the working poor,” said Dr. Amy L. Sherman of
There has been significant movement in 
ideological positioning around values 
related to work and personal responsibility.
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the conservative Hudson Institute. “There needs to be
discussion on ‘unfinished business of welfare re f o rm . ’
C o n s e rvatives need to be less interested in ‘welfare savings’
and more ready to spend ‘saved’ funds from welfare
reform on aid to the working poor and on intensive aid
to the bottom 20 percent of super hard cases.” 7 This view
was reflected in the strong bipartisan agreement within
the National Governor’s Association during the 2002
debate over TANF reauthorization that federal spending
on TANF funds not be decreased despite the major re d u c-
tion in welfare caseloads on the grounds that states need
this extra money to ensure that former welfare recipients
succeed and advance in the workplace.8
The Importance of Wealth and Assets
Perhaps the biggest shift of recent years has been a greater
agreement among liberals and conservatives on the need to
help individuals accumulate assets. While an overall emphasis
on building wealth reflects the values of personal responsi-
bility and planning for the future, the idea of giving people
special assistance to do so re flects the values of fairn e s s ,
equal opport u n i t y, and collective responses to economic
inequity. The notion of wealth building is central to the
American Dream ethos of economic opportunity, and par-
ticularly to the idea of intergenerational advancement. Yet
during the debates over poverty from the 1960s through
the mid-1990s, issues of wealth and savings received com-
paratively little attention. Instead, these debates focused
heavily on income support and various other forms of gov-
ernment assistance for low-income Americans. 
To the degree that discussions over wealth accumulation
took place in the old poverty debates, they tended to reflect
significant polarization of core views. Liberals emphasized
how lack of income prevented people from saving and
pointed to the legacy of “redlining” and a historic pattern
of locking communities of color out of opportunities to build
wealth through government programs that subsidized home
ownership. Conservatives stressed personal responsibility,
thrift, and hard work as the key to savings and asset accu-
mulation—often invoking the experience of various immi-
grant groups to bolster their arguments. 
While these basic differences in viewpoints endure, the
c u rrent debate over wealth has moved far beyond this limited
and polarized conversation. Not only are there hopeful signs
of growing agreement on issues of wealth, but the fact that
wealth issues loom far larger in today’s debate over poverty
than previous debates is itself significant.
• Liberal policy thinkers, scholars, foundations, and think
tanks have given significant new attention to issues of
wealth accumulation and asset ownership over the past
decade. Important developments in the asset-building
movement include the publication of Michael Sherr a d e n ’ s
book Assets and the Poor in 1990, the publication of B l a c k
Wealth/White We a l t h by Melvin Oliver and Thomas
S h a p i ro in 1995, and the decision by the Ford Foundation
to make asset building a central strategy in its work to
reduce poverty. 
• In backing IDAs, some conservatives agree that a lack of
assets is major perpetuator of poverty and inequality, and
often one that is passed down over generations. George
W. Bush endorsed IDAs in his election campaign, stating
that “the great promise of our time is to fight poverty
by building the wealth of the poor. A home to anchor
their family. A bank account to create confidence.”
• Helping low-income individuals and communities accu-
mulate assets through home ownership, local business
development, and various “self help” strategies is a key
goal of the community-building movement. The pro-
g ressive organization Policylink, for example, emphasizes
the need for residents of low-income communities “to
become owners in the development process—to be stock-
The idea of giving people special assistance to build 
wealth reflects the values of fairness, equal opportunity,
and collective responses to economic inequity.
depth and scope of this consensus is evident by the fact that
top officials in the Nixon Administration and many leading
Republicans in Congress were deeply committed to fur-
thering and expanding various aspects of the Great Society.
It was President Nixon, for example, who first proposed the
idea of a guaranteed family income. 
A very diff e rent kind of consensus helped abolish the federal
w e l f a re entitlement in 1996. While the Republican takeover
of Congress in 1994 ostensibly made possible the passage of
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opport u n i t y
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), conserv a t i v e
Republicans hardly had a monopoly on attacking welfare .
Many moderates of both political parties, including Pre s i d e n t
Bill Clinton, also attacked welfare and wanted to fundamen-
tally overhaul the system—a position that won overw h e l m i n g
s u p p o rt among the general public. The Republican electoral
v i c t o ry in 1994 ensured that welfare re f o rm had a harsher
edge than might otherwise have been the case, but PRW O R A
is more rightly viewed as a re flection of a political and public
consensus that was nearly two decades in the making. 
A New Consensus?
In considering the potential for a new era of common gro u n d
on poverty policy and fresh progress toward improving the
lives of low-income Americans, it is easy to see the glass as
either half full or half empty. A half-full analysis suggests
that the various shifts discussed above have laid a founda-
tion for much wider political agreement on how to build
economic security. In particular, growing economic inse-
curity among more Americans—combined with a pro s p e r i t y
that lavishly rewards the “haves”—can be seen as drawing
m o re broad-based attention to the need to correct for market
failures in areas such as wages, health care, child care, and
housing. The old and divisive debate over poverty—one that
extended roughly from the early 1970s to the mid-1990s—
can be viewed as decisively over. The frames of that debate,
which centered on the “undeserving poor” and on gov-
e rnment programs that backfired, can be seen as having
decreasing traction in current public policy debates. In the
half-full analysis, the stage is set for a range of more suc-
cessful advocacy efforts that will result in a new generation
holders, not just stakeholders in local economic activity.”9
In addition, there has been significant bipartisan support
for policies aimed at encouraging capital to flow into
poor neighborhoods, such as Empowerment Zones. 
• There has been growing agreement across partisan lines
about the need to eliminate longstanding rules that stop
low-income families with assets over certain levels from
receiving public assistance. 
Why Common Ground Matters
Understanding the present and future potential areas of
consensus around issues of poverty and economic well-
being is critical to identifying the opportunities that exist
in the early 21st century to improve the economic position
of tens of millions of low-income Americans. Big things are
most likely to happen in American public policy during
periods of broad consensus. Indeed, the history of eco-
nomic and social policy over the past century suggests that
the outcomes of electoral battles can be less decisive than
the outcomes of battles around ideas and values. 
Consensus and Policy Change
In the first two decades of the 20th century, various
P ro g ressive Era re f o rms came about less because of par-
ticular electoral developments than because of the rise of
a new political consensus about the need for more active
g o v e rnment to counterbalance the power of private inter-
ests and soften the harsh edges of industrial capitalism.
O rganized labor and other elements of the political left played
a major role in bringing about this shift—but so too did
leading businessmen, as well as mainstream media outlets
and a range of member-based citizen groups and re s e a rc h
o rganizations that saw themselves as nonideological and
n o n p a rt i s a n .1 0 During the New Deal, widespread economic
insecurity helped broaden and deepen the consensus in
favor of active government and strong social pro g r a m s .
Likewise, the prosperous Great Society era saw substan-
tial consensus in many sectors of American society about
the need for energetic efforts to help poor Americans. The
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of federal, state, and local commitments to helping both
low- and middle-income Americans share more broadly in
this nation’s economic prosperity. 
The half-empty analysis suggests a bleaker picture. It
emphasizes the continued disagreements within political
c i rcles over major entitlement programs like Social Security,
M e d i c a re, and unemployment insurance. It stresses the
enduring division over what kinds of support low-income
people deserve and what should be expected of them in
re t u rn—divisions showcased by the 2002 Congre s s i o n a l
debate over reauthorization of PRWORA. It stresses the
ways that widespread economic insecurity can just as easily
inflame social divisions and undermine trust in collective
solutions as lead to new kinds of broad-based responses to
i n e q u i t y. And, perhaps most tre n c h a n t l y, the half-empty
analysis focuses on the political deadlock on issues of taxes
and spending. Effective economic security programs that
command a bipartisan following are of little use if there is
no broader agreement on making the resources available to
bring these programs to scale.
The thrust of this re p o rt is that the glass is half full. The
public policy developments examined in the pages that follow
show that serious bipartisan eff o rts were made to help low-
income Americans during the 1990s. Each policy examined
tapped into a core value of both liberals and conserv a t i v e s ,
enabling bipartisan support. Pro g ress re g a rding each policy
can be seen as indicative of the potential for a broader and
deeper consensus on poverty in the years to come. Still, as
the case studies that follow will illustrate, bipartisan agre e-
ment has often been quite tenuous, especially when pro p o s a l s
a re made to expand anti-poverty policies in ways that cost
m o re money. The cases also illustrate that bipartisanship has
f requently been the result of political horse trading, rather
than re flecting a lasting convergence of views.
Implications for Advocacy
Regardless of whether one sees the glass as half empty or
half full, knowing which public policies command a stro n g e r
b i p a rtisan following can help shape the near- t e rm and long-
term agendas of advocates and policymakers. In the near-
term, those committed to helping low-income Americans
can use this information to determine where they are most
likely to score victories and make fresh pro g ress. More specif-
ically, the nature of consensus and conflict in today’s debate
over economic security suggests that the “easier” victories
for advocates lay in seeking incremental gains in three areas:
income and wage supplements to help working individuals
and families; healthcare and childcare subsidies focused on
working families; and further development of asset-building
policies. The conclusion of this report discusses the impli-
cations for advocacy in more depth. 
Beyond helping advocates shape their near- t e rm agenda,
an understanding of real and potential areas of consensus
is critical for longer term success. Such an understanding
can help advocates formulate an overarching values-based
s t o ry in which to frame major new eff o rts to help expand
economic security and opportunity in the early 21st
c e n t u ry. While public policy victories are often won issue
by issue, greater success comes to those movements in
American politics that effectively link together a range of
issues within a grand story that can be easily understood
by average people. 
To d a y, no grand story dominates national discussions
over povert y, and this gives advocates a major opport u-
nity to seize the advantage. The ambiguous economic con-
ditions of recent years—tremendous prosperity yet gro w i n g
insecurity for more and more Americans—makes it par-
ticularly important to forge clearer links between diff e re n t
policy ideas and also invest in quality “message” work.
C l e a r l y, though, any new and successful grand story that
generates support for more aggressive eff o rts to pro m o t e
equity must be carefully formulated to resonate stro n g l y
with the values of a majority of Americans. While many
advocates emerged from the 1990s feeling discouraged,
analysis of developments around EITC, IDAs, SCHIP,
and EZs suggest that a new and powerful grand story
about building economic security may be closer at hand
than many re a l i z e .
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Today no grand story dominates national 
discussions about poverty. This gives advocates 
a major opportunity to seize the advantage.
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The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a refundable credit administered by the IRS.
Originally set up as a small program to remove re g ressive income and Social Security taxes
for low-wage workers, the federal EITC was expanded dramatically in the 1990s and is
now claimed by nearly 20 million families and individuals.1 1 It is paid as a tax refund, even
if the worker has earned too little to pay tax. In order to receive a check from the IRS,
b e n e ficiaries must file a tax re t u rn. In 2001, families with any earnings up to $32,000
w e re eligible for some amount of credit, with a maximum credit available of $4,000.
The EITC’s Bipartisan Past
The EITC has had a long tradition of bipartisan support. It has ardent supporters in
both political parties and is seen as one of the nation’s most successful antipoverty pro-
grams. What accounts for the EITC’s success and popularity? Christopher Howard, who
has written extensively on the EITC, commented that the key factor is “its consistency
with basic American values.” 12 The EITC uses the tax system to encourage people to
find employment, thus reinforcing the work ethic, at the same time reducing the welfare
rolls—without creating a new welfare program. The EITC is thus antipoverty, a tradi-
tionally Democratic concern, and also pro-work, there f o re conforming to the Republican
ideology now attractive to many Democrats.13
The EITC has a long and complex history.1 4 Originating from the Negative Income
C redit (NIC) proposed by conservative economist Milton Friedman in 1962, the idea
initially gained acceptance among conservatives as a way to keep people off welfare. A
c o n s e rvative Democrat, Senator Russell Long, was the major legislative force behind the
first EITC.1 5 He argued that the working—and “deserving”—poor should be re w a rd e d ,
w h e reas the nonworking but “able” poor should lose entitlement benefits. Though liberal
thinkers were unenthusiastic about the effectiveness and scope of the EITC, conserv a-
Making Work Pay
The Earned Income Tax Credit
Kemp, Secre t a ry of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) under George Bush, stated that it was “essential
to expand the earned income tax credit” as a way of getting
away from a system that “re w a rds welfare and unemploy-
ment at a higher level than working and pro d u c t i v i t y. ”1 9
Clinton’s philosophy was more focused on eliminating
p o v e rty for working families. The legislation intro d u c e d
during his administration contained a provision for helping
working families without children. In keeping with the
ideals of the New Democrats, Clinton argued that the
EITC “is not a handout. It’s a helping hand. That’s an impor-
tant distinction.” 2 0
Conflict and Consensus
After the 1993 expansion of the EITC, bipartisan support
for this policy showed signs of crumbling. Since 1986,
“spending” on EITC had more than doubled. The Wa l l
S t reet Journ a l called the program “more of a direct handout
than a tax re f u n d .”2 1 Though many Republicans re m a i n e d
s u p p o rtive, others were now worried that one original goal
of the EITC—to remove re g ressive Social Security taxes
f rom the working poor—had been co-opted into a big
spending welfare entitlement. Senator Roth (R-DE) was par-
ticularly annoyed with the program. Introducing legislation
in 1995 to re f o rm the EITC, he claimed that “the original
intent of the program has been lost as the EITC has been
t u rned into another Federal giveaway pro g r a m . ”
R e p resentative Bill Archer (R-TX), chair of the House Wa y s
and Means Committee, was another opponent. Although
the EITC is “often re f e rred to as a ‘tax’ program,” he arg u e d ,
“it is in reality a spending pro g r a m .” 2 2 The EITC has also
attracted fire from some liberals, who argue that too much
of the cost of maintaining antipoverty wages has been taken
away from employers, leaving government—and there f o re
taxpayers—to foot the bill. As Jared Bernstein of the Economic
Policy Institute has argued: “relying solely on tax policy to
raise the incomes of low-wage workers is a serious mistake.” 2 3
tives agreed with Long. Viewed primarily as a form of tax
relief, they believed that it would encourage work and keep
the welfare rolls in check. The EITC was thus touted as an
a l t e rnative to welfare, rather than as a way to guarantee a
minimum income. Signific a n t l y, too, its impact was framed
as a loss of tax receipts, rather than a gain in spending—a
good way to avoid partisan battles over budgetary alloca-
tions. Following heavy lobbying by Long, the Senate Finance
Committee Chairman, the EITC was enacted in 1975 during
the Ford Administration.
As a small, inexpensive program, the EITC was initially
v e ry modest in its coverage. In 1977, President Cart e r
included EITC expansion in his welfare re f o rm bill. Though
the bill as a whole failed, the EITC was generally popular
in Washington, and it was made a permanent provision in
the Internal Revenue Code in 1978. Between 1979 and 1985,
minor changes were made to the EITC. However, declaring
the program “the best antipoverty, the best pro-family, the
best job creation measure to come out of Congress,” Pre s i d e n t
Ronald Reagan substantially expanded the program with
bipartisan support in 1986.16 Liberals thought the program
was now big enough to reduce the tax burden and increase
income for the poor. Conservatives continued to like its pro -
family and pro-work elements
(although conservative analysts
suggest that Republican support
for this expansion was in return
for a top-rate tax cut).17 EITC
was subsequently expanded in
1990 in Bush’s Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act (OBRA), and
again in Clinton’s 1993 OBRA.
For both Presidents George
Bush and Bill Clinton, the EITC
resonated with a general phi-
losophy of empowerm e n t .1 8 J a c k
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The EITC has had a long tradition of bipartisan support.
President Ronald Reagan called the EITC “the
best antipoverty, the best pro- f a m i l y, the best
j o b-creation measure to come out of Congress.”
With the EITC increasingly depicted as a spending
p rogram, the partisan battles of budgetary politics (the
avoidance of which had once been a crucial reason for the
policy’s success) began to loom large in the mid-1990s, fol-
lowing the Republican takeover of Congress. In 1995
Republicans proposed legislation that would have signifi-
cantly cut EITC expenditures by accelerating the EITC
“phase-out” rate, denying EITC to families without chil-
dren and to illegal aliens, and including all income (such as
Social Security) in the refund calculations. The Republicans
claimed that the loss to families with children would be
made up by a per-child tax credit;24 Democrats were very
much opposed to these proposals. In a bitter struggle marked
by intense partisanship, Clinton refused to sign off on leg-
islation embodying the cuts proposed by Republicans. Other
Republican efforts during the 1990s and in 2000 to cut the
EITC were also rebuffed.
There are now 16 states with EITC legislation based on
the federal cre d i t .2 5 In addition, two local govern m e n t s
(Montgomery County, Maryland, and Denver, Colorado)
offer local EITCs. State level EITCs, many of which have
been enacted since 1997, have gained support across the
political spectrum. They have been enacted in states led by
Republicans, in states led by Democrats, and in states with
bipartisan leadership.26
A Look to the Future
Although bickering endures between the parties about the
size, stru c t u re, and aims of the EITC, there remains general
b i p a rtisan agreement that the EITC is a sensible way to aid
low-income families and to re w a rd work. The EITC is sup-
p o rted by most Republicans and Democrats in Congress, as
well as many of the American people. A 2001 survey found
66 percent of the public were favorable toward the EITC.2 7
Many conservatives continue to voice concern that the EITC
has become a form of welfare, and there f o re many support
the policy with a measure of caution. “EITC has some pro s
and cons. Boosting work income is good; another entitle-
ment program expanded to millions of people is bad,” says
John McClaughry.2 8 “I’d support expansion of EITCs for
m a rried couples,” says Marvin Olasky.2 9 G e o rge W. Bush is
heavily in favor of reducing the financial penalty for marr i a g e
in general, but has not proposed overall expansions of the
EITC. An expansion of EITC, however, is strongly support e d
by liberals, such as John Burbank, executive director of the
Economic Opportunity Institute, who would extend the
upper income range of the EITC.3 0 Overall, many on both
left and right would argue, as does Alan Houseman, dire c t o r
of the Center for Law and Social Policy (CLASP), that the
“EITC is the most effective and strongly bipartisan antipovert y
p rogram” in America.3 1
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The Earned Income Tax Credit form.
An Individual Development Account (IDA) is a special matched savings account
designed to enable people living on low-incomes to build assets such as a first home,
p o s t - s e c o n d a ry education or training, or a small business. Similar to an Individual
R e t i rement Account (IRA), money deposited in a special IDA account is matched by
g o v e rnment and/or private funds. After a specified period of time, money can be with-
drawn by the individual and invested in a business, a home, or an education. Like the
EITC, IDAs may soon be incorporated into the tax code to provide more individuals
with an opportunity to save and build assets. Compared to the other antipoverty poli-
cies examined in this paper, IDAs are much smaller in scope and relatively little known
outside of traditional policy circ l e s .
The Birth of IDAs
The idea for IDAs was introduced in 1989 by Michael Sherraden of the Center for
Social Development (CSD) and supported by the Pro g ressive Policy Institute and the
Corporation for Enterprise Development (CFED).3 2 S h e rraden’s seminal book A s s e t s
and the Poor i n s p i red CFED to establish a 2000 account pilot demonstration pro g r a m
(the American Dream Demonstration) in 13 sites to test the concept in 1997. Soon
a f t e r, IDA programs began appearing in communities across the country. By 1998
t h e re were 40 community organizations with IDA programs, and more than 25 states
had included them as part of their welfare re f o rm pro g r a m s .3 3 IDAs are funded fro m
a variety of sources, including private foundations, financial institutions, employers,
individuals, and federal and state dollars.
At the federal level, IDAs have been incorporated into the TANF program; welfare -
to-work funding following the 1996 welfare re f o rm; a refugee resettlement pro g r a m ;
the Bank Enterprise Aw a rds program at the U.S. Tre a s u ry Department; and the
Building Wealth and Assets
Individual Development Accounts
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ally available only to those in the middle- and upper- i n c o m e s
brackets. IDAs also attract Republican support because they
partner community groups with private banks and credit
unions, thus reducing the role of government in favor of
private business and community and faith-based groups.36
Jack Kemp, one of the first Republican supporters of IDAs,
wrote in 1990 that: “Owning something changes behavior
in ways that preaching middle-class values never could. . . .
That’s why I’m determined to do what I can to put assets
in the hands of the poor.”37
Agreements in the States
In the states, as at the federal level, IDAs attract a wide
range of bipartisan support, including from extreme wings
of each political part y. State IDAs were initiated by the
action of community groups, which often appro a c h e d
Democratic legislators largely because they expected them
to be more re c e p t i v e .3 8 The first state IDA was enacted
under the leadership of a Democrat, State Senator Elaine
Simoniak in Iowa,3 9 but was favorably received by the states’
major conservative think-tank, the Public Interest Institute.4 0
A significant minority of state legislation was actually spon-
s o red by Republicans (for example, legislation in Wi s c o n s i n ,
Illinois, and Ohio). Other bills have had co-sponsors on both
sides. For example, liberal Democrat Donny Osman spon-
sored a recently passed bill in Vermont entitled “An Act
Assisting Families to Attain Self-Sufficiency.” He had no
problem getting conservative Republicans to join him since
they saw the legislation as a positive alternative to welfare.41
In general, Republican support at the state level was
i n fluenced by John Kasich (R-OH), who chaired the House-
Senate committee charged with drafting the final version
of the welfare re f o rm law. Yet Democrats also took on the
idea as their own, given that the IDA legislation was orig-
inally drafted as part of their own welfare re f o rm bill (and
then remained in the Republican version that passed). Thus
at state level, IDAs were viewed as both Democratic and
Republican, which, according to the CSD, “really helped
Community Reinvestment Act. Also, IDA-like accounts
a re being implemented through federally supported enti-
ties such as the Federal Home Loan Banks and thro u g h
“Family Self-Sufficiency Accounts” at public housing author-
ities throughout the country. In addition, IDAs may be
linked to federally defined and subsidized “Electro n i c
Transfer Accounts,” through which federal benefits, for-
merly delivered via check, are routed directly through fin a n-
cial institutions. Finally, account matching and (limited)
administrative funds are now available to nonpro fit org a-
nizations through the fiv e - y e a r, $125 million Assets for
Independence (AFI) Demonstration Program administere d
by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Serv i c e s .
A Bipartisan Approach to Poverty
The designer of IDAs, Michael Sherraden, argues that assets
provide a “cushion against adversity,” so that the lives of
people in poverty become “economically and psychologi-
cally more stable, less vulnerable . . . which often leads to
greater family security, social esteem, and political involve-
m e n t .” 3 4 In the conserv a t i v e
c o n g ressional climate of the
1990s, however, IDAs were
emphasized  as a means to
encourage “self-suffic i e n c y,” and
thus to reduce “dependency.” 3 5
As shown by the history of
bill sponsorship, both Democrats
and Republicans support IDAs.
IDAs attract liberals because they
support disadvantaged groups,
s p read wealth, and provide incen-
tives to save in ways tradition-
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IDAs attract liberals because they support disadvantaged 
groups. IDAs attract Republican support because they 
partner community groups with private banks and 
credit unions, thus reducing the role of government.
“The great promise of our time is to fight poverty
by building the wealth of the poor. A home to
anchor their family. A bank account to create 
c o n fidence.” —George W. Bush, campaign speech,
Cleveland, Ohio, April 11, 2000
set the tone for the states and helped them come aboard
m o re quickly.” 4 2 Though rarely actively supported by the
executive branch, it was unusual for IDA legislation to have
any problem getting signed by the Govern o r s .
The Future of IDAs
IDAs are currently on the policy platforms of both the
Democratic and Republican parties, re flecting their history
of bipartisan support. Even staunch conservatives opposed
to other antipoverty policies are open to IDAs. John
Goodman, the conservative director of the Center for
National Policy Analysis, calls them “an excellent place to
deposit the government surplus,” and conservative John
M c C l a u g h ry likes them because they are a “pro - o w n e r s h i p
idea.” Similarly, Amy L. Sherman, senior fellow of the
We l f a re Policy Center at Hudson Institute, thinks they are
“ v e ry important and very underutilized at present.” 
Liberals are more guarded about their support of IDAs.
Alan Houseman states that “IDAs are a small piece of
income support, have bipartisan support and should be
encouraged but they do not begin to meet the income
s u p p o rt needs of poor families.” And according to Chuck
Collins of United for a Fair Economy, “there is nothing
w rong with IDAs as long as they are part of a solution
that includes adequate income.” 4 3
C u rre n t l y, bipartisan legislation proposed to expand IDAs,
the Savings for Working Families Act (SWFA) of 2001,
sponsored by Senators Lieberman (D-CT) and Santorum
(R-PA), would provide additional incentives for investment
in IDAs and create close to one million IDAs. Specifically,
it would provide a 100 percent tax credit to financial insti-
tutions to provide one-to-one matches up to $500 per qual-
ified individual saving in an IDA. Though IDA advocates
such as CFED had hoped that IDAs would be included in
the Community Renewal and New Markets Act in 2000 or
in a charitable giving package in late 2001, they are still hopeful
that the legislation will pass in 2002.
One reason for this optimism is the support from Pre s i d e n t
G e o rge W. Bush, who based part of his New Pro s p e r i t y
Initiative on the SWFA, proposing $1.7 billion for tax
c redits for IDAs in his budget. He said during his pre s i-
dential campaign, “Many people who are now successful
can remember how hard it was to save—but how impor-
tant it was to start. And we can help many Americans make
that star t. As president, I will propose Individual
Development Accounts.” 4 4
Stephen Goldsmith, Bush’s chief domestic policy advisor,
is also a known supporter. He wrote in 2000:
Compassionate conservatives recognize that those without eco-
nomic means need assistance, but they believe that the way to do
that is to create the conditions that allow more individuals to
become homeowners. Rather than providing public housing, gov-
e rnment can offer low-cost home loans or help people with down
payments or even encourage the creation of independent devel-
opment accounts so that citizens who don’t have a lot of money
receive tax incentives to encourage them to save and invest.”4 5
Republicans and Democrats clearly have diff e rent inter-
p retations of the benefits of IDAs. Unlike other antipovert y
policies, however, unity has arisen around the idea of the
IDA itself. Accord i n g l y, it has not been necessary for either
side to compromise on policy points, and there have been
few disputes related to high spending demands. The youth
of the policy has limited the development of disagre e m e n t s .
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Michael Sherradens’s Assets and the Po o r and Melvin
Oliver and Thomas Shapiro’s Black Wealth/White We a l t h
brought critical attention to the issues of asset and
wealth development.
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Support for Working Families
The Children’s Health Insurance Program
The State’s Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) was enacted to extend cov-
erage to children whose parents’ income precludes them from qualifying for Medicaid.
More than two and a half million children are enrolled in SCHIP.
A Bipartisan Victory
On April 8, 1997, the Child’s Health Insurance and Lower Deficit Act (S 525) was
introduced into the Senate; the act allocated $20 billion to subsidize children’s health
insurance, paid for by a tobacco tax hike from companion bill S 526.46 The intention of
the legislation was to provide insurance for children in families unable to afford the high
cost of health insurance but who make too much money to qualify for Medicaid. In late
July of the same year, the bill was enacted with amendments and bipartisan support as
Title XXI of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. The program, SCHIP, made available
more than $20.3 billion to states to expand health insurance coverage to children in
families with income below 200 percent of the federal poverty line.47 Each state stood
to receive a federal allocation proportional to its share of the nation’s uninsured chil-
dren, with a match more generous per child than Medicaid.
SCHIP was a landmark piece of legislation. Not only was it the largest expansion of
a federal healthcare program since the introduction of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965,
but also, unlike the latter (which passed under a Democratic president and a Democratic
C o n g ress), it passed with bipartisan support .4 8 The legislation was introduced after the
f a i l u re of Clinton’s universal health care plan in 1993. Democrats had abandoned uni-
versal health coverage but were looking for incremental re f o rm. Children were an ideal
place to start: Census data from 1995 showed that about 10 million children under
age 18, or 13.8 percent of children, were uninsure d .4 9 Potentially there was also ro o m
for Republican support. Under welfare re f o rm, parents moving from welfare to work
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w e re often losing Medicaid coverage—but worked for
employers that did not offer health benefits. Children of
h a rd-working parents were left vulnerable. Children’s health
insurance thus became an issue for both Democrats and
Republicans. Conservative groups were not, however, active
in crafting the bill. Rather, the liberal Children’s Defense
Fund (CDF) took a pivotal role in spreading the idea among
sympathetic organizations such as the Child We l f a re League
and the American Academy of Pediatrics, convening meet-
ings and drafting legislative possibilities.5 0
The successful bill was sponsored by Senator Edward
Kennedy (D–MA), who brought on board Senator Orr i n
Hatch (R-UT), a Republican with a history of support for
c h i l d ren who was a previous ally of Kennedy’s. The bill was
a compromise, with measures drafted to please both
Republicans and Democrats.5 1 The bill proposed that the
details of program administration should be left up to the
states, re flecting Republican pre f e rences for devolution.
The bill allowed the states either to expand Medicaid, or
to create a separate program for children—or to combine
the two appro a c h e s .5 2
To raise the money for SCHIP, Senator Hatch pro-
posed a tobacco tax hike in a companion bill, a tax that
would also generate revenues for deficit reduction. He
a rgued that the resulting bill was “good for childre n ”
because it would “reduce teenage smoking, and . . . lower
the deficit. How can a conservative argue with that?” 5 3
T h e re were, however, many conservative objections to the
bill. Majority leader Trent Lott derided the SCHIP pro-
posals as “a Kennedy big-government program” and was
re p o rtedly furious with Hatch for developing the bill
without him.5 4 Other conservative senators also objected
to the bill. In the house, moderate Republican Nancy
Johnson (R-CT) proposed a version of SCHIP that gave
m o re flexibility to states—$16 billion in block grants with
no guarantee that it would be used to cover uninsure d
c h i l d ren, and no tobacco tax.5 5 This was the version favore d
by the state governors. 
By May 1997, President Clinton included $16 billion
for SCHIP in the budget agreement with the Republicans.
The bill then entered the 1997 Balanced Budget Act, the
companion bill to the Tax Relief Act and a fie rce political
b a t t l e g round. By early July, diff e rences between the House
and Senate versions of the bill remained. Clinton was in
favor of the Senate version of the bill, though he believed
that all the money raised from the cigarette tax should go
to children’s health and none to deficit re d u c t i o n .5 6 A f t e r
fie rce lobbying by the Children’s Defense Fund and other
g roups, and with last minute revisions to budget pro j e c-
tions to create new spending potential, the Senate Finance
Committee added $8 billion to the original $16 billion and
voted to increase the tobacco
tax by 20 cents.5 7 Still nerv o u s
that the legislation would pro v e
fateful for the balanced budget,
Clinton had to be persuaded,
while Lott convinced fellow
Republicans that the public re l a-
tions fallout of not support i n g
a child-fr iend ly pro g r a m
wouldn’t be worth it.5 8 A deal
was eventually announced: The
tax hike would be just 15 cents. 
SCHIP at the State Level
On a state level SCHIP has had major bipartisan appeal:
Just over a year after the federal legislation was passed, nearly
e v e ry state had sought to take advantage of it.5 9 Yet the details
of the program gave Republicans and Democrats cause to
argue. The issues most hotly disputed were: (a) whether to
use federal funds to expand Medicaid (an entitlement) or
to create a new program (capped and means tested); (b)
which income groups to make eligible (affecting how much
the program would cost); (c) how much to charge the newly
eligible population for participating in the program; and (d)
SCHIP was a landmark piece of legislation that passed 
with bipartisan support. It represented a classic political 
compromise for both Democrats and Republicans.
In 1997, President Bill Clinton 
signed legislation creating SCHIP.
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providing health insurance for children. The first child was
c o v e red by SCHIP in April 2000, well after most other
states.) Bush also supported the proposal that SCHIP eli-
gibility be capped at 133 percent of the poverty line, rather
then the 200 percent supported by some Democrats (which
would have reduced the number of children eligible by
a round 22,000). The Democrat-controlled state legislature
opposed Bush and was successful in raising the eligibility to
200 percent in exchange for measures to deter childre n
from dropping private insurance. Bush later reportedly told
a key supporter of SCHIP, State Representative Glen Maxey
(D-Austin): “You crammed it [SCHIP] down our thro a t s .” 6 6
Analysts suggest that Bush’s opposition was based on his
desire to fund a tax cut, his dislike of federal programs, and
a reluctance to spend more on Medicaid (since a spillover
effect of the SCHIP legislation is that those who apply are
then eligible for Medicaid).67
A Look to the Future
When it was passed, SCHIP represented a classic political
compromise for both Democrats and Republicans. Recent
evidence suggests that the program has deeper bipartisan
s u p p o rt now than it started with. By December 2000, more
than two and a half million children were enrolled in SCHIP.6 8
In 1999, U.S Census data showed that the number of unin-
s u red children under 18 dropped for the first time in decades,
from 15.4 percent in 1998 to 13.9 percent in 1999, and
among poor children from 25.2 percent to 23.3 percent.69
Yet, as Edward Kennedy has said, the Democrats “were n ’ t
coasting” in their campaign to pass SCHIP. It was the will-
ingness of one Republican—Orrin Hatch—to bring his
whether to include measures to deter people covered by
private insurance from dropping it in order to enroll in
SCHIP.60 In debates on all of these points at the state level,
Democrats and Republicans tended to take positions that
reflected longstanding ideological preferences.
C a l i f o rnia has one of the largest SCHIP programs in
the nation, and is an interesting example of the debates
a round program design. Advocacy groups and Democrats
f a v o red using SCHIP money to expand Medicaid to 200
p e rcent above the federal poverty level—a common
Democratic position in many states. They argued that the
i n f r a s t ru c t u re was in place and thus would facilitate speedy
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n .6 1 Yet Republican Governor Pete Wi l s o n
was only willing to sign a bill increasing health coverage
for children in a separate plan. Republicans didn’t want
the state adding to “entitlement programs” (Senator Ken
Maddy (R)),6 2 nor for families to “suffer from the welfare
stigma that’s often associated with the states’ Medi-Cal
p rogram” (Governor Wi l s o n ) .6 3 ( Wilson considered Medi-
Cal to be an overly bureaucratic government mess.) 6 4 T h e
Democrats compromised and agreed to a separate pro g r a m ,
though remained unhappy that the bill did not make full
use of federal funds. Sponsor Antonio Villaraigosa (D)
pushed it through, encouraging members of both part i e s
to “seize the historic moment, and not quibble about the
best way to do that.” Nineteen conservative Republicans
did vote against the bill, however, fearful that childre n
would drop private coverage. In the words of the L o s
Angeles Ti m e s, the Republicans were worried that “the
p rogram will amount to an expansion of government sub-
sidies for the poor, and could prompt small employers to
cancel group health plans, knowing the government would
p rovide coverage for their workers.” 6 5
Texas also has one of the largest SCHIP programs in the
nation, and it too provides a good example of the partisan
debates that led to the enabling legislation. It also illus-
trates the significance of the role played by the governor of
the state. Governor George W. Bush was in fact accused of
taking no initiative with SCHIP, leaving it instead to the
state legislature. (The Children’s Defense Fund ranked Te x a s
45th in its efforts to implement SCHIP Texas, and 49th in
Child Health Plus is New York State’s SCHIP program.
There are now 16 states with EITCs based on the federal credit.
sidize enrollment in private health plans or to pay employee
p remiums for employer coverage. Other conserv a t i v e s
echo this position.
Might a bipart i s a n - s u p p o rted expansion of childre n ’ s
health insurance occur in the next few years? Chip Kahn,
e x - p resident of the conservative Health Insurance Association
of America (HIAA), and Ron Pollack, executive dire c t o r
of Families USA, an organization with a liberal orienta-
tion, both think this could occur. In a recent paper they
p roposed a compromise between Republican-favored tax
c redits and Democrat-favored federal expansion.7 1 T h e i r
suggestion is to build on current pro g r a m s — i n c l u d i n g
SCHIP—while also extending tax credits. The HIAA would
not ordinarily support expanding SCHIP and Medicaid;
Families USA would be unlikely to advocate tax cre d i t s .
But both organizations believe that making one condi-
tional upon the other is a way forw a rd. As they point out:
“ F rom the perspective of the uninsured, any so-called ideal
plan that cannot get enacted is no solution at all.” 7 2
party on board that was a crucial factor. The two senators
had the common desire to provide children of working
parents access to health care. To appeal to both sides, they
e n s u red that the bill contained values common to both
Republicans and Democrats. Still, once it got to the states,
debates that had been avoided at the federal level did tend
to create divisions along party lines.
These divisions endure within the public policy com-
m u n i t y. Liberals tend to see SCHIP as one step toward
universal health coverage and would like to see it expanded
to parents. Yet many conservatives remain ideologically
opposed to SCHIP. For example, John Goodman of the
National Center for Policy Analysis, one of Bush’s health-
c a re advisors, says that SCHIP is “simply a substitute for
private insurance. It costs taxpayers billions for no net
g a i n .” 7 0 He would prefer the introduction of “medical
savings accounts” (which enable people to spend tax-fre e
dollars on healthcare services) and allowing states to sub-
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E m p o w e rment Zones (EZs) are impoverished areas designated for revitalization thro u g h
the development of public and private partnerships to attract the investment necessary
for sustainable economic and community development.
The Evolution of an Idea
E m p o w e rment Zones were first implemented in the United Kingdom under Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s. EZs conformed to Thatcher’s right-wing phi-
losophy: minimum government interf e rence to allow economic re v i t a l i z a t i o n .7 3 T h e
concept for EZs was originally developed by a British liberal-left urban planner, Peter
Hall, as a way to stimulate economic activity in abandoned industrial areas.74 But it was
in their free-market guise that Stuart Butler, of the conservative think tank the Heritage
Foundation, brought EZs to the United States. He sold the idea to President Reagan
and then to Congressman Jack Kemp, who took on legislative responsibility for them,
formulating a plan for a break in the capital gains tax for business investors. The idea
gained some liberal support. The first Urban Jobs and Enterprise Zones Bill was intro-
duced by Kemp and Robert Garcia (D–South Bronx, NY) in 1980 with support from
both President Reagan and African-American civil rights groups such as the National
Urban League and the NAACP.
Enterprise Zone legislation was never signed by Reagan. A lack of enthusiasm for EZ
legislation in his administration, and especially in the Tre a s u ry, stalled the legislative
p rocess. Some states, however, began to enact their own legislation during 1980s; by
1991, 37 states and the District of Columbia had created Enterprise Zones.7 5 During the
Bush presidency both Democrats and Republicans introduced numerous EZ bills at the
federal level. A bill sponsored by a Democrat, Charles Rangel of Harlem (NY), a member
of the influential House Ways and Means Committee, gained the most support. The bill
never became law, partly because it was included in a tax bill unacceptable to Republicans.
Community Development
Empowerment Zones
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Reconciling Two Visions
In 1999 the Republicans proposed a new form of EZ, the
Renewal Community (RC), to take back the ideological
ground lost to the Democrats. The American Community
Renewal Act would create zones with less government inter-
ference and give benefits to businesses with no constraints,
and it featured an abolition of capital gains taxes. Despite
major differences of opinion, in November 1999 Clinton
pledged to work with Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-IL) on a
b i p a rtisan initiative to revitalize impoverished communi-
ties. The plan would include Clinton’s New Markets ini-
tiative and EZ expansion, and the Republicans’ RCs. After
extensive negotiations, a bipartisan agreement was announced
in May 2000. Clinton got his EZ expanded and strength-
ened, the Republicans got a zero-rate capital gains rollover
for investments within the EZs. Clinton got the wage cre d i t
into the 40 RCs—but at a rate less generous than EZs—
and the Republicans got their zero capital gains rate (on
the sale of assets held for more than five years) for business
investors. Republicans also agreed to expand the low-income-
housing tax credit in return for allowing faith-based orga-
nizations to qualify for substance abuse funding.78
Descriptions in news re p o rts indicate that both sides
w e re very pleased with the agreement. “This is not only
the most comprehensive anti-poverty package coming out
of the federal government . . . in a generation but it also,
I think, has assimilated the lessons that people on both sides
of the aisle have learned over the last generations,” said
R e p resentative Talent (R-MO) at the time.7 9 The legisla-
tion was passed as the Community Renewal and New
Markets Act in December 2000.
The inclusion of a capital gains tax break was a gre a t
victory for Republicans. Jack Kemp declared the agreement
“a hopeful sign” and “a fair bipartisan deal.”80 However, it
seems that the additional Democratic EZs that piggybacked
on the new RCs were accepted as a compromise measure,
Empowerment Zones
P resident Clinton came out in support of Enterprise Zones
in his 1992 election campaign. In May 1993 he signed
OBRA and enacted EZs as his first antipoverty legislation.
The Clinton-based plan was based on four principles: (1)
economic opport u n i t y, (2) sustainable community devel-
opment, (3) community-based partnerships, and (4) a
strategic vision for change.7 6 He authorized HUD and the
USDA to designate 10 “Empowerment Zones” (six urban,
t h ree rural, and one Indian re s e rvation) and 100 enterprise
communities (65 urban, 30 rural, and five Indian re s e rv a-
tions). The final legislation contained $2.5 billion in tax
b reaks and $1 billion in financing, and authorized a 20
p e rcent wage credit for the first $15,000 in wages paid to
a zone resident who also worked within the zone; pre f e r-
ential tax treatment for certain depreciable pro p e rty; and
special tax-exempt bond financing. The act also cre a t e d
the President’s Communities Enterprise Board, with Vi c e
P resident Al Gore as chair. 
In December 1994, six urban EZs (New York, Detro i t ,
Chicago, Atlanta, Philadelphia/Camden N.J, and Baltimore )
and three rural EZs (Kentucky Highlands, Mid-Delta
Mississippi, and the Rio Grande Va l l e y, Texas) were chosen
for the program. Each urban EZ received a block grant of
$100 million over 10 years (rural EZs received $40 million),
plus several billion dollars in bonding authority and tax
b reaks. In addition, another 95 Enterprise Communities
w e re created with lesser benefits and block grants of $3
million. The Tax Relief Act of 1997 established two more
urban Empowerment Zones (effective January 1, 2000).
In these zones, qualified businesses would be eligible to
use the tax incentives created in OBRA 93. The legislation
also created 20 additional urban and rural Empowerm e n t
Zones effective January 1, 1999, in which qualified busi-
nesses could utilize the increased expensing limits and the
tax-exempt financing, but not the wage cre d i t .7 7
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Empowerment Zones were first implemented in the United 
Kingdom under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s.
rather than one reflecting common ground. Senator Bond
(R-MO), for example, stated that the EZ part of the package
“certainly was not my recommended legislation, but this
was part of the bipartisan compromise we reached with the
President and incorporated it in the bill.”81
Consensus or Compromise?
The Republican Party was the original supporter of Enterprise
Zones in the United States. Like the EITC, Enterprise Zones
w e re financed through tax expenditures, rather than by
revenue spending. In line with traditional Republican ide-
ology this meant giving money back to businesses to stim-
ulate growth (thus providing jobs to those willing to work),
instead of directly to the poor. As President Reagan put it
in his 1984 State of the Union address, “I ask your help in
assisting more communities to break the bondage of depen-
d e n c y. Help us to free enterprise by . . . voting ‘yes’ on our
p roposal for Enterprise Zones in America. Its passage can
help high-unemployment areas by creating jobs and re s t o r i n g
n e i g h b o rh o o d s .”8 2 Ve ry similar language would be used by
P resident Clinton in promoting his Empowerment Zones.8 3
Although using tax incentives to revitalize poor com-
munities economically seems to re flect common gro u n d
between the Democrats and Republicans, there remain sig-
n i ficant ideological diff e rences between the parties. Democrats
and Republicans both feel existing law in this area is flawed.
And whereas Republicans think that EZs should be a sub-
stitute for social programs, Democrats argue that they should
be just one means of boosting poor communities.
Consider the nature of liberal support for Reagan’s orig-
inal EZ proposals. According to analyst Marilyn Marks
Rubin, “Liberals who supported Enterprise Zones were des-
perate to find some way to improve conditions in their
communities and were frustrated with the traditional ways
of providing governmental assistance. . . . Many of them
tended to see the tax incentives...as tools to help urban are a s
but not as a substitute for the programs that were being
dismantled by the Pre s i d e n t .” 8 4 S t u a rt Butler himself said
later that liberal support for the policy was “triggered by
the feeling that an enterprise zone program was the only
a p p roach likely to be acceptable to Reagan and the Reagan-
dominated Congre s s .” 8 5 EZs provided at least some federal
money for the poverty-stricken inner cities. 8 6
But liberal support for the Reagan EZs was very weak. For
example, Charles Rangel, the Democrat congressman fro m
Harlem who later became a driving force in EZ legislation,
was against the early versions of EZs. He saw EZs “as a weak
substitute for the social programs that were being disman-
tled under Reagan.”8 7 Under Bush, Rangel changed his view:
“I rejected the whole thing under Reagan. But people came
to me and said, ‘How can it hurt?’ So I just said, ‘What the
hell.’ But when it started to look like urban policy for the
nation, it was obviously inadequate.’”8 8 Rangel thus start e d
to work on EZ policy, but with a diff e rent ideological emphasis:
g o v e rnment intervention to fight discrimination, to cre a t e
a ff o rdable housing, and to ensure businesses that located in
EZs actually invested in the communities. The focus, too,
was to be on a bottom-up planning pro c e d u re, with the details
of how to revitalize the area being left up to the community.
Under President Clinton, EZs drew strong liberal support
because the Clinton Administration’s version envisioned
far more government assistance. The OBRA 1993 legisla-
tion combined the tax incentives from the Kemp-Bush plan
with (a) increased grant spending that could be used for
economic development, housing, job training, and other
needs, and (b) a tax incentive that was not based on capital
gains but was rather a wage credit for local employment to
e n s u re government money was going to job cre a t i o n .
A c c o rding to Andrew Cuomo, then the assistant secre t a ry
for community planning and development at HUD, the
a p p roach combined “the best of all present and past the-
ories. . . . We think we took the best lessons from the
Enterprise Zones, improved upon them and added the ele-
ments that were lacking. We learned from the short c o m-
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Democrats and Republicans both believe legislation in this 
area was, and is, flawed. Republicans think that EZs should 
be a substitute for social programs; Democrats argue that 
EZs should be just one means of boosting poor communities.
and tax breaks on the other—into one legislative package.
The Republicans dislike public spending, the Democrats
dislike unregulated tax cuts. The combination of the two
approaches may be bipartisan, but it does not reflect con-
sensus on core values.
In many ways, the bipartisan compromise underlying
legislation on EZs satisfies neither Democrats nor Republicans.
Many liberal antipoverty advocates remain deeply skeptical
of EZs. For instance, Miriam Walden, director of Just
Economics, argues that “Empowerment Zones are too often
used to re c ruit businesses away from other communities that
need them, and to give subsidies to businesses that don’t
pay a living wage, offer decent benefits, allow unions to org a-
nize, and contribute to the community.”9 5 By contrast, con-
servatives such as John Goodman call EZs “all subsidy; no
freedom.” Other conservatives tend to be more open to
the idea, but not without reservations.
Although President George W. Bush has not spoken pub-
licly about this issue, ideologically the RCs are likely to gain
support from his advisors. Stephen Goldsmith, Bush’s chief
domestic policy advisor and the former mayor of Indianapolis,
has voiced strong support in the past for tax incentives for
businesses to revitalize downtown areas. He claims that
there is strong bipartisan support for this at the local level.
He is also a strong proponent of empowering mayors who
recognize “the importance of tax cutting in reviving urban
economies.”96 He is also in favor of removing all federal
taxes at the same time as removing all federal grants. Popular
opinion, meanwhile, generally favors tax breaks—but at a
cost. A 1997 survey indicated that 71 percent of the pop-
ulation favored giving companies tax breaks, but only as an
incentive to hire and train welfare recipients.97 Currently,
the future of Empowerment Zones—or Renewal
Communities—remains very uncertain. 
ings and linked the tax incentives to hiring within the
z o n e .” 8 9 When the EZ act was passed in Congress, it was
dubbed “Enterprise Zones for Liberals.” 9 0
Not surprisingly, the Democratic interpretation of EZs
i n s p i red many Republican critics. Jack Kemp was one of
them. He said that the Clinton-Gore EZs were indicative
of a “socialist economy,9 1 c o n firming that the Democratic
administration had “the most anticapitalist mentality this
c e n t u ry. ”9 2 Echoing similar sentiments, Republican Vi n
Weber insisted that “far from empowering local commu-
nities, the Clinton plan dramatically expands Wa s h i n g t o n ’ s
role in the inner cities. . . . This flies in the face of the basic
philosophy behind enterprise zones: empowering indi-
viduals and local communities by getting bureaucrats out
of the way.” 9 3
A Look to the Future
EZs have been on a roller coaster ride since the idea was
first introduced into the United States in the 1980s. At first
they were part of a program entirely focused on regulatory
relief for businesses. Then they became a comprehensive
program aimed at empowering communities to plan their
own revitalization. Ultimately they combined both
a p p roaches. The RCs also re flect this combination, although
they are touted as more of a tax-slashing package than a
community empowerment policy. This agreement reached
on RCs, according to one commentator, shows that “Clinton
and Hastert have found common ground on an issue both
p a rties have pro m o t e d — s p reading America’s booming eco-
nomic growth to communities mired in poverty.” 94
Yet the agreement is less a manifestation of common
g round than a carefully tailored plan that combines two
starkly diff e rent approaches to combating poverty: spending,
investment, and community involvement on the one hand
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The four cases of policy development analyzed in this re p o rt suggest important lessons
for advocates and policymakers determined to increase economic well-being and oppor-
tunity in the United States. In the past decade, an era otherwise marked by intense
ideological warf a re over issues of poverty and economic security, some pro g ress has
n e v e rtheless been made in improving the situation of low-income Americans. To be
s u re, this pro g ress has been limited, and it has occurred against a backdrop of nega-
tive policy developments that, in many ways, have left low-income Americans more
i n s e c u re and more vulnerable to economic downturns than they were a decade ago. 
Still, the developments analyzed in this report can be seen as signaling the beginning
of a new and different public policy debate in the United States over issues of economic
well-being and opportunity. This debate is less about such polarizing issues as welfare
dependency and out-of-wedlock births, and more about the practical challenges of
helping working families make ends meet, allowing more Americans to build wealth and
assets, and bringing greater economic opportunity to communities that have been cut
o ff from the economic mainstream. While the terms of the previous poverty debate during
the 1980s and early 1990s decisively favored those arguing for less government inter-
vention to help low-income Americans, the terms of the emerging poverty debate incre a s-
ingly favor those who promote more activist approaches to closing the prosperity gaps.
Many of these activist approaches, it should be noted, do not rely exclusively on gov-
e rnment, but—like Empowerment Zones and IDAs—use government re s o u rces in
concert with the resources of the private and non-profit sectors.
Looking more specifically at the implications for advocates and policymakers of the
four cases in this re p o rt, a few important points stand out. The first is the promise of
i n c re m e n t a l i s m. In a period of frequent partisan deadlock over public policy and con-
strained fiscal imagination, pro g ress on economic security issues is most likely to come
in small steps. Children’s health insurance and IDAs are classic examples of compar-
Conclusion
Building on Common Ground
De-m o s:  A  N et w o r k  f o r I d ea s  &  A ct i on 3 7
to be the case with IDAs, where initial federal efforts not
only appear to be succeeding, but are also generating support
for IDAs within the private sector, nonprofit groups, and
state and local government. 
As advocates and policymakers look ahead into the future ,
a number of significant incremental gains appear possible
over the next few years that can work together to improve
the lives of low-income workers and families. Possible gains
include a higher minimum wage, expanded health insur-
ance coverage, expanded childcare subsidies, expansions in
the EITC, a major expansion of IDAs, and other steps
forward.98 These gains, in turn, have the potential to lay
the groundwork for larger and more significant efforts to
reduce poverty and build economic security. Several areas
of potential progress are discussed in more depth below:
Income and Wa g e s . G rowing political agreement over
the need to increase the prospects of low-income workers—
p a rticularly those with childre n — p resents advocates with
a range of opportunities. Although many Republicans have
balked recently at overall increases in the generosity of the
EITC and have increasingly attacked the program because
of problems of fraud, leaders on both sides of the political
divide have nevertheless suggested certain additions to the
p rogram in the past year, such as enlarging EITC benefit s
for families of three or more children and abolishing penal-
ties around the program associated with being marr i e d .9 9
The states also present an important arena to advance the
EITC, and advocates have made steady pro g ress in expanding
the number of states with the EITC. The political climate
of recent years has been less receptive to eff o rts to incre a s e
the minimum wage. However, the combination of a gro w i n g
consensus that the working poor need help, along with new
fiscal constraints on government’s ability to help these indi-
viduals, could make policymakers increasingly receptive to
a d d ressing this problem through hikes in the minimum
wage, which re q u i re no new spending. The unpre c e d e n t e d
atively modest programs that are able to generate bipar-
tisan support. The expansion of the EITC is also a story
of incrementalism, since the currently large program was
not implemented in one fell swoop but rather grew to its
p resent size over time.
The promise of incrementalism is understandably not
v e ry exciting to most advocates and policymakers. However,
it is critical to distinguish between incrementalism as a vision
and incrementalism as a strategy. If anything, those who are
concerned today with closing the prosperity gap must think
m o re ambitiously about their end goals, not less ambitiously.
With new policy frameworks and new language, advocates
can and should resurrect the dormant national goals of sig-
nificantly slashing poverty rates and ensuring comprehen-
sive supports for working families. That said, the strategy
of incrementalism is a key to success in the present histor-
ical moment, and, indeed, has had a rich history of success
in other periods. For example, Social Security became the
t ruly effective antipoverty program it is today through a series
of incremental expansions—backed by bipartisan support —
to the program over a period of decades, the most dramatic
of which took place in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
M e d i c a re itself is a prime example of an incremental pro g r a m
in that, like SCHIP, it represented a step in the direction
of universal health insurance. Incremental expansions to
Medicare since its passage in 1965 have also broadened that
program’s reach. 
The strategy of incrementalism can facilitate common
g round on economic security issues because add-ons to
existing government programs or new programs that are
small in scope are inherently less threatening to those who
wish to limit the reach of government—both because of
concerns with cost and concerns about unintended conse-
quences. Yet if new add-ons or pilot programs are successful,
they not only help make a case for further activism, but also
can build a constituency for such activism. This seems likely
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The developments analyzed in this report signal the 
beginning of a new and different public policy debate 
in the United States over economic security issues.
a g reement in Spring 2002 by Republican and Democratic
legislators in Albany to increase the minimum wage in New
York State is indicative of the potential for pro g ress in this
a rea. Another promising area for bipartisan pro g re s s ,
although one not discussed in this re p o rt, lies in eff o rts to
i n c rease job skills and employment opportunities for low-
skilled workers.
Health Care and Child Care . I n c reasing agre e m e n t
about the need to ensure that low-income working pare n t s
a re able to work opens up major new opportunities to advance
p roposals for greater subsidized child care and health care .
While these opportunities are difficult to realize fully in a
period of fiscal austerity, growing public and political support
for new initiatives may at least produce an increasing tempo
of incremental gains. The success in November 2001 in
Washington State of a ballot initiative to increase healthcare
coverage for low-income working adults, as well as the passage
in New York in 2000 of Family Health Plus, a major new
h e a l t h c a re initiative for the uninsured, hint at the opport u-
nities that exist at the state level for such pro g ress. More gen-
e r a l l y, many states have moved since 1996 to expand eligibility
for health insurance coverage of children (and parents in
some cases), as well as eligibility for subsidized childcare. At
the national level, important advocacy eff o rts are underw a y
to expand Medicaid coverage to low-income workers, an
idea that should seem like common sense to anyone who
wants to encourage and support work among low-income
individuals. A compromise proposal by the Health Insurance
Association of America and Families USA would pro v i d e
health coverage for all persons with incomes below 133
p e rcent of the federal poverty line through Medicaid, as well
as help cover other low-income workers through tax cre d i t s
and SCHIP-type coverage.1 0 0 Successfully moving fro m
a g reement on the need to cover the children of low-income
working adults to gaining agreement on covering the adults
themselves ranks as among the most critical gains that might
be made in the coming few years. 
Wealth-Building Policies. The considerable success of
pilot IDA programs in galvanizing bipartisan support at
the national and state level suggests the potential to gre a t l y
expand these programs in the coming years. Just as the EITC
g rew from a small and limited program into a major eff o rt
to bolster the economic security of working families, so
too it is possible to imagine IDAs following a similar tra-
j e c t o ry. The support of IDAs by President Bush and many
other Republicans, and the gains in Congress in 2002 of
the Savings for Working Families Act, which would fund
IDAs for 900,000 individuals, makes it likely that IDAs
will move up to a new tier of expanded scope and funding
within the next few years. An expansion of this kind for
IDAs will allow the potential of this policy to be far more
widely demonstrated and, inevitably, will build a con-
stituency for further expansion of IDAs in the coming years.
In addition to IDAs, a range of other asset-building poli-
cies have the potential to gain in coming years, including
special matched savings accounts for children. Meanwhile,
t h e re is growing bipartisan agreement on the need to curb
p re d a t o ry lending and other kinds of “wealth stripping”
practices that undermine the ability of low-income people
to accumulate assets.
Even as advocates and policymakers move forw a rd to
s c o re incremental gains in the next few years, they must
also adopt a longer- t e rm vision and strategy for turn i n g
the new common ground on economic security issues to
their advantage. Clearly, an exciting opening is emerg i n g
to tell a broad new story about economic security and
o p p o rtunity in America. Such a story could be the third
major narrative to win bipartisan support and frame
American public policy in this area over the past half
c e n t u ry. The Great Society narrative of the 1960s and
early 1970s emphasized the imperative of sharing America’s
p rosperity more bro a d l y, creating a more inclusive society,
and harnessing the powers of effective government to
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Growing political agreement over the need to
increase the income of low-income working families
provides advocates with a range of opportunities.
a reas—income and wages, health care and child care, and
asset building—must eventually build into far larger ini-
tiatives that promise much bigger gains, or they will re m a i n
l a rgely palliative in the overall context of an economy that
is leaving behind a significant percentage of Americans.
The catch is that dramatic action to scale up eff o rts that
now enjoy some degree of bipartisan support will be very
d i fficult to achieve as long as current ideological divisions
e n d u re around taxes and government spending. The low
salience of economic security and poverty issues in curre n t
public debates serve to exacerbate this deadlock. The tough
work of finding agreement on how to finance policies that
p romote opportunity and equity is less likely to occur in
the absence of elected officials feeling strong public pre s-
s u re to move an agenda in this area. 
Looking ahead, the challenge is not just to deepen
emerging areas of consensus on how public policy can best
reduce poverty and build economic security. The challenge
is also to find greater consensus in major outstanding areas
of contention. How to pay for new public policy initiatives
is the most obvious of these areas, but there are many others,
including how to structure welfare and related programs
and how to strengthen Social Security and Medicare. 
In some areas, it is quite likely that pro g ress toward
greater consensus will remain elusive and it will make less
sense for advocates to engage in a search for common gro u n d
than to advance their own values and policy agenda more
sharply. Still, while the debates ahead over public policy on
economic security will continue to be characterized by much
division, these divisions should not obscure the fresh and
promising common ground that is now emerging. 
achieve these goals. The conservative narrative of the 1980s
and 1990s, also embraced by many moderate Democrats,
s t ressed personal re s p o n s i b i l i t y, the counterpro d u c t i v e
n a t u re of many government programs, and the necessity
of work among welfare recipients. 
The emerging new story about economic well-being and
opportunity borrows elements from both these past narra-
tives. It emphasizes the significant disparities of wealth and
income in an age of tremendous prosperity, and highlights
the troubling social exclusion that comes with these dis-
parities. It stresses the necessity of government action to
redress economic disparities, helping to create more oppor-
tunities for better paid work in the new economy, ensuring
that all people who work have the income to make ends
meet and ways to build wealth, and that families receive key
supports to enable them to work. In other words, the new
story puts forth a renewed vision of social responsibility to
compensate for the shortcomings of the market. But the
new story also recognizes that social responsibility must go
hand in hand with personal responsibility and underlines
the importance of work, savings, and planning for the future. 
The bipartisan gains made in recent years to impro v e
economic well-being and opportunity for low-income
Americans have helped to stake out the contours of this
e m e rging story. Incremental gains over the next several
years can help to clarify and advance a national vision for
a new consensual approach to sharing America’s pro s p e r i t y
m o re bro a d l y. Still, this vision must ultimately stress dra-
matic, large-scale action if it is to offer real hope for the
tens of millions of people in the United States who are stru g-
gling with economic hardship. Incremental steps in key
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Advocates and policymakers must adopt a longer-term
vision and strategy for turning the new common ground 
on economic security issues to their advantage.
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